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TELLING STORIES: LIFE HISTORIES, ILLNESS NARRATIVES, 
AND INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPES 
A Catalogue of his sins, eh? Is that what you mean? 
asked Orlick. 
Do you understand what I mean ?asked Furriskey with 
solicitude. 
I think I do, mind you. DRUNKENNESS, was addicted 
to. CHASTITY, lacked. I take it that's what you had in 
mind, Mr. Furriskey? 
That sounds very well gentlemen, said Lamont, very 
well indeed in my humble opinion. It's the sort of queer 
thing they look for in a story these days. Do you know? 
(Flann O'Brien, At Swim-Two-Birds, p.245). 
INTRODUCTION 
The following transcript is at once part of a life history as well as what 
we have come to call in medical anthropology an "illness narrative." I 
collected it during my fieldwork in Ireland in 1988-1990 from a man 
whom I am calling for the purposes of this paper Finbar McTernan. This 
text is the fruit of my attempt to elicit a story of a chronic condition, from 
a life that has, for better or worse, been defined by both this condition and 
the struggle against its label chewing into the rest of an existence. 
This story develops from a complicated life at the margins - at the 
margins of society, of economic success, ultimately of health itself. It is 
also marginal in another sense. It is a narrative from an articulate person 
with schizophrenia-  species that much current medical speculation on 
the subject is loath to imagine. The subject at once acknowledges his 
(occasionally) profoundly altered phenomenological sense of himself and 
his surroundings, while struggling against his engulfment by a body of 
knowledge, psychiatry, which, in his eyes, sees little of him beyond an 
illness label. 
In this paper, I develop the idea that a narrative of a chronic condition 
is not simply a story of personal experience. It is, rather, deeply embedded 
within various institutional structures that influence its production as a 
Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 19: 39-72, 1995. 
9 1995 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin theNetherlands. 
40 A. JAMIE SARIS 
story. As part of my interest in the embeddedness of narrative within 
institutional frameworks, I also want o focus the reader's critical attention 
on my own use of a fragment of a transcript from an open-ended interview 
in the production of a knowledge-product in medical anthropology. 
NARRATIVES IN MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
Clearly, I frame this piece initially as "a kind of story." As such, this paper's 
theoretical roots reach into a body of work on "narrative" that has enjoyed 
substantial growth in the past fifteen years. Important work on this sub- 
ject has emerged in literary criticism and philosophy (Iser 1978; Ricoeur 
1981, 1984; Derrida 1978, 1981; Lyotard 1984 among many others), 
in psychology and psychoanalysis (Bruner, J. 1986), history (White 1981), 
and anthropology (Good 1994; Mattingly 1994; Kleinman 1988a, 1988b; 
Abu-Lughod 1993; Bruner, E. 1984; Turner 1981, 1986 among many 
others). 1 How people tell stories, and why these stories are aestheti- 
cally, rhetorically, and/or technically effective has become a respectable 
academic topic. Indeed, narrative is one of only a handful of key terms 
in social analysis that have been fruitfully pursued from a wide variety of 
different disciplinary perspectives. This interest is hardly surprising iven 
the centrality of texts (often first-person accounts) collected from subjects 
in the interpretive social sciences. 
In the face of this expanding area of scholarship, I will restrict myself 
in this paper to one main theme that might be called "the conditions of 
narrative production" inmedical anthropology. Specifically, I am interested 
in the relationship between the production and the consumption of stories 
about chronic onditions as they relate to what I am calling "institutions." 
To map out this issue, I will need to review a bit of personal history. 
I have spent he last two years in fairly close contact with people who, 
in part, write grants to medically-oriented funding agencies for a living, 
presenting and representing medical anthropology to other, potentially 
hostile, disciplines as worthy of funding dollars for psychosocial research 
in a shrinking rant pool. During this same period, I have also served on the 
Central Office Research Review Committee for the Department ofMental 
Health of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in whose meetings I have 
defended the value of anthropological methods and ways of thinking to my 
more quantitatively-inclined colleagues. I have noticed certain connections 
between the theoretical justifications of the grants that I have read and my 
own protestations in committee. Such justifications of non-quantitative 
psychosocial projects argue for an intrinsic value in the "qualitative data" 
generated by social scientists (specifically anthropologists), which tends 
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to translate in such settings as "narrative data gathered from open-ended 
interviews." I think that these experiences, while hardly representing the 
acme of theorizing on narrative in medical anthropology, have something to 
say about models of narrativity at large in the sub-discipline. These models 
form a frame for my own retextualizing ofa fragment of an interview ithin 
the context of an academic paper. 
Such justifications, for example, either explicitly or implicitly insist on 
the value of texts generated in the process of getting a person's tory from 
that person. "You [meaning anthropologists] ap the source of experience," 
said one of the MDs with whom I work on committee. He was presenting 
to me his understanding of "qualitative data," at once conceding a certain 
closeness of the anthropologist to "real life," while critiquing the inherent 
conceptual messiness of this neighborliness. While many of our more 
quantitative colleagues find our explanations about what exactly we do 
with such texts during the course of our analysis omewhat opaque, if not 
occasionally occult, there is still a certain respect generated in them for 
the supposed proximity of the anthropologist to the raw experience of real 
life concentrated in "a story" that wins for us what (admittedly limited) 
influence we command in such settings. 
The sense of narrative that emerges in this setting is captured by the 
following model. 
EXPERIENCE ----) NARRATIVE > TEXT 
t I 
INTERPRETATION 
In this model experience is the wellspring of narrative which is transcribed 
in a text from which a process of interpretation can lead us back to the 
original experience. Few researchers working with something like this 
model pretend to capture an event hrough a "transparent" ext, but many 
do seem to argue that, insofar as an individual phenomenology undergirds 
a narrative, this experience is able to be captured through a process of 
the qualitative analysis of particular transcripts. Such an understanding of 
narrative in both the clinical encounter and in more general contexts poses 
some serious theoretical issues for medical anthropology. 
INSTITUTIONS 
My basic suggestion in this paper is that making a larger analytical 
place for a concept of "institution" in our understanding of narratives 
of "personal" experience is a strategy for knitting together the presence 
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of agency, meaning, and power in the production of stories. This extra- 
subjective aspect to the production of an illness narrative xists beyond the 
patient/therapist/family context that has been fruitfully explored in recent 
years (Mishler 1986a, 1986b; Mattingly 1994; DelVecchio-Good et al. 
1994; Good and DelVecchio Good 1994 among others). While these and 
other dialogical approaches tonarrative have detailed the micro-contexts 
of stories in medical contexts, the current lack of an institutional focus in 
our increasingly sophisticated theories about the formation and dissem- 
ination of illness stories in medical anthropology masks the fact that so 
much of the discipline operates in expressly or covertly institutionalized 
settings, 
By "institution" I do not simply mean a particular building or even a 
self-evident social network, but rather, following the Latin root of the word 
"institute," instituere, "to set up," I mean a structure (physical, conceptual 
or both) that "sets up" discourse and practice. This definition is close to 
that found in the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard. 
[A]n institution differs from a conversation i that it always requires constraints for 
statements o be declared admissible within its bounds. The constraints function to filter 
discursive potentials ... They also privilege certain classes of statements ( ometimes only 
one) whose predominance haracterizes the discourse of the particular institution: there are 
things that should be said, and there are ways of saying them ... Bureaucratization is the 
outer limit of this tendency. [Lyotard 1984: 17] 
I am defining institutions, then, as bundles of technologies, narrative 
styles, modes of discourse, and, as importantly, erasures and silences. 
Culturally and historically situated subjects produce and reproduce these 
knowledges, practices, and silences as a condition of being within the 
orbit of the institution. This definition of institution focuses our attention 
on the ability of the institution to define and constitute as well as on the 
silences and erasures that provide the persuasive force for such definitions. 
As such, my use of the term "institution" has resonances with the concept 
of "field" and associated notions like "symbolic violence" that appear 
in the writings of Bourdieu (1984, 1991). This way of conceptualizing 
institutions, I believe, gives us an appreciation of such organizations that 
goes beyond the idea that the main function of an institution is to control 
its inmates and reproduce itself (Goffman 1961) or to Douglas' notion that 
the main function of an institution isto name (Douglas 1987). 
A broader, more discursive concept of institution isa strategy that allows 
us to begin to outline the relationship between system and innovation, 
power and agency, and structure and contingency in the construction of 
stories. Rather than looking at institutions as unproblematic envelopes 
around more central narrative information and rhetorical strategies, I want 
to think of institutions as helping to constitute stories as well as being sites 
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of narrative productions. The problem of institution, then, necessarily bears 
on our thinking about he relationship between texts, narratives, practices, 
and discourses. The focus on institutions also emphasizes the fact that here 
are institutional ssumptions that both constitute and help to constrain the 
production of knowledge in medical anthropology. 
The model of the relationship between text, narrative, experience, and 
institution that I am proposing, then, looks something like this. 
I I 
I NAKRATIVE  x EXPERIENCE ~ T TEXT 
N R 
I think that there are a number of ways that this sort of model advances 
a theory of narrative in medical anthropology. First, it problematizes the 
relationship between "experience" and the development of a story about 
that experience in such a way as to focus our attention on the specific 
circumstances, that is, the social field in which narratives are developed 
and deployed. This way of looking at narrative does not invalidate the 
usefulness of the notion of "personal experience" for medical anthropology, 
but it does distribute the responsibility for the production of this experience 
to presences beyond an experiencing self. Second, this model stresses 
the importance of textual production within an anthropological analysis. 
This subject is too often glossed in medical anthropology as merely the 
development of qualitative data from "unstructured" interviews. While this 
theme of institutional constraint of my own narrative production will be 
impossible to explore fully in the analysis, I will be referring to it now and 
again as a presence in, and potential critique of, my own writing. 
FINBAR MCTERNAN: BACKGROUND 
I first introduced myself to Finbar McTeman after a talk he gave to an all- 
day meeting in Dublin under the auspices of the Schizophrenia Association 
of Ireland (SAI), an organization that is the rough equivalent of the National 
Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) in the United States. My initial 
impression of him was that he was an articulate, if disheveled, individual, 
fairly anti-psychiatric in his mental health beliefs, whose Northern accent, 
softened only slightly by nearly a decade of residence in Dublin, imparted 
a certain forcefulness to his speech. Over the coming months, we became 
friends with one another, meeting in the city center for the occasional cup 
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of tea, for formal interviews at my place, and interacting around monthly 
meetings of sufferers of schizophrenia organized into a Support Group 
under the auspices of the SAI. 
Finbar is a middle-aged man diagnosed with schizophrenia who has 
spent much of his adult life in contact with the mental health services 
both in the North and in the Republic of Ireland. He was bom in 1946 
just outside the town of Omagh in the county of Tyrone, the fifth of nine 
children of a postman. He was educated at a Catholic school in a relatively 
severe nvironment by priests and Christian Brothers. He eventually went 
on to earn a degree at Queen's University, Belfast in pursuit of a career as 
a teacher at the secondary level. For Finbar, the thirteen years recounted 
below form the time frame of the most critical period of his life. They 
are part of a story about his journey from initial contact with institutional 
psychiatry to his definition as a chronic schizophrenic. 
The main narrative line of the following text is deceptively simple. 
It is Finbar's answer to my question about how he was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. At one level, then, it is an account of a career of a mental 
patient, a slow and conflicted connection over the course of thirteen 
years between a profoundly altered experience of self and reality and a 
knowledge-construct, s hizophrenia, that, psychiatry insists, accounts for 
these altered perceptions and behavior through amodel of"disease." Inter- 
spersed in this basic plot, however, are Finbar's reflections on his position 
in society, the nature of knowledge and morality, and the evident connec- 
tions between even his most disordered sense of "reality" and the social 
life surrounding him. 
10 
15 
F: When I first began having trouble, the general 
practitioner was consulted first. He recommended 
that I see a specialist. He probably wouldn't have 
said, "nerve specialist," but the people, my 
mother, and the older people, the people generally 
in the town, they talked about a "nerve 
specialist." That is when they mentioned it at 
all. A lot of the time they wouldn't have wanted 
to talk about it, because we talked about he "big 
house," you know, that is the asylum out the road. 
It would only have been about a mile and a half 
outside the town, in fact, it now really [is] 
almost in the town. It was actually unusually 
close to the town, the Omagh [mental hospital]. 
Tyrone and Fermanagh: T and F, they call it now, 
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yeah. 2He's in the T and F. I think it's full of 
mostly alcoholics now. 
J: So, it's mostly full of alcoholics now? 
F: It is so. You know, I 'm rather skeptical about 
"alcoholism" as a disease ntity. I think there's 
a fair bit of what we call ... I don't know, 
"spoiling" yourself ... First of all you drink 
yourself into a problem, then you get people to go 
and tell you you've got an illness, you know. It's 
great, you got it both ways, and then you can look 
down on schizophrenics. I used to find that the 
schizophrenics in the hospital were second-class 
citizens. You were treated as a lunatic, you were 
shoved around, sometimes literally. But, the 
alcoholics .... no problem. They were on no 
medications, no side-effects. They [went] on about 
there like kings of the castle, you know ... 
We are in fact the lowest, 
we're on the lowest rung of society that there is. Because ven 
mentally handicapped people are not in a comparable 
situation because they're supposedly kind of 
separated in a sense. People say well ... OK, they 
don't understand, maybe, or they're not able to do 
certain things. But they probably get better 
treatment as such, you know, they're more appealing 
to people. 
J: Uh huh. 
F: People .... The attitude people have to lunatics 
or schizophrenics is that, you know, they're 
dangerous, they're sort of ... you know, they're 
horrible. You know you hear some awful things 
said, in fact. I 'm pretty angry about his guy 
Owen Harris of RTE, 3 that's putting on a couple 
programs about manic depression. 4 
J: Oh yeah. 
F: My brother was watching one of the things he was 
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on about hat came on before. He [Owen Harris] was 
advertising it. And, he says - talking to John 
Ogden, the pianist- you see, a famous pianist. 
He had a breakdown and was supposedly classified as 
manic-depression. He lives in a house separated 
from his wife by a kind of, some kind of, ... steel 
wall or something like that, or a steel partition, 
and he must be violent, you see. So Harris says -
he's a complete [?]... 
His approach to it is, you know, "Manic- 
depressives are all geniuses, and I 'm a genius too 
because I 'm a manic-depressive." He's blowing his 
own trumpet, you know. 
But, uh, he says, you see, ah, he says - John 
Ogden, John Ogden is a bit violent. He says, 
"Ogden must be a bit schizophrenic," he says, 
"Because manic-depressives arenever violent." And 
this is the kind of shit that's given publicity. 
J: Really? 
80 
85 
F: He's putting us down, and at the same time, he's 
getting a program out of it, manic-depressive. And 
he's saying, "Manic-Depressives, you know, 
Beethoven was a Manic-Depressive." Everybody's a 
Manic-Depressive, you know. You're nobody if 
you're not a Manic-Depressive. 
J: [Laughs] 
90 
95 
F: It's the same as alcoholism. Brendan Kinelly, 
the poet, he writes in the Irish Times, "Alcoholism 
is creative." Yeah, it's creative - it creates a
bloody nuisance for people, especially when you 
come home and beat your wife, you know, that's 
creative all right. 
I think if you, if you create a problem by 
drinking and are told then that you're ill and that 
you deserve sympathy. I think that it's a wee bit 
much. Life is reward and punishment. If you're 
rewarded for behaving irresponsibly, ou'll tend 
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to, I think, inevitably, I think you'll tend to 
sort of continue it. Get worse, maybe. 
So, of course, it's a growth industry, too, 
because the doctors actually, they want more 
alcoholics. C'mon, you know, c'mon all in. 
There's plenty of space here for alcoholics. No 
problem. 
But I 'm getting abit off the point .... 
J: That's all right. 
110 
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F: The thing is .... I would like to find out 
something about hat-  the alcoholics. What 
exactly it is? You know ... the doctor is 
approaching something, and he's kind of saying, 
like all down the centuries, people have said, you 
know, leaders and scientists, o-called scientists 
in those days, priests and whatever they might have 
been in the old societies. They say, "Look, the 
moon arises, and the moon is this sort of thing." 
They're kind of approaching an unknown quantity, 
and they're saying that they know all about it, you 
know. 
That's sort of saying, that's a ... [long pause] 
People say to you that they're xperts, you know. 
"But, they are experts!" Certainly, they got the 
power to put you away, to lock you up, and so on. 
But, I don't know if that means they're xperts. 
J: What happened after the General Practitioner? 
130 
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F: Then, I was all right for a while. I actually 
started to teach. I was teaching for two years, in 
'68-'70. After that, I packed it in. I stopped 
the teaching. I left the job at the end of the 
school year in '70. And then I sort of did 
nothing. I went to London, and then I came back. 
I was hanging about he house and that. 
Then in '71 I got another ... 
You see in these two times, '66 and '71, I wasn't 
actually diagnosed, as a ... I wasn't old I was 
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schizophrenic. I didn't actually go "around the 
bend" as such. You know, I wasn't "mad" in the 
conventional sense of the word. I'd just get 
terrible restless, sort of agitated epression, 
that kind of thing, you know. 
J: Yes. 
F: Dr. MacDermot [a psychiatrist in Belfast], he 
came to me. He went to the house at that time to 
see me. He stayed about two minutes, you know ... 
He came in. I was sitting watching the TV. This 
was in '66, and he says, "Do you feel people are 
against you?" That was all he said. He never even 
said "Hello." 
He said, "Do you feel people are against you?" 
I said, "Actually, I don't feel people are 
against me, as a philosophical proposition." 
J: [Laughs] 
F: I didn't want to go on and, like, develop it 
because, you know, doctors are usually very short 
on philosophy, I find. They kind of, you know, 
they don't like people philosophizing. But, uh. I 
said that I got the impression that those faces on 
the TV there that are in the crowd, you know - it 
was a rugby match I was watching - are sort of 
hostile, you know. Well what it was, I thought he 
environment had become unpleasant, you know. 
Everything was hard, harsh, you know. But, I 
wasn't deluded as such. I wasn't mad. I didn't 
think that the people were trying to kill me or 
anything. I just felt, it was almost, you can't 
It was a total altering of your perception. It's 
as if I was in this room, and I felt that you were 
sort of"looking at me" in a kind of critical way, 
or you thought I was no good, or something like 
that. You thought, you know, you're sort 
of despising me. 
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As I say, it was a hostile environment. But, he 
[MacDermot] must have, he must have ... He gave me 
Largactil, he put me on bloody Largactil, you know. 
I didn't know these things. At that time I thought 
these are great hings, they're gonna help you. I 
didn't know anything about side-effects. There was 
no information about side-effects in those days. 
In fact, I remember saying to him, you know, 
Largactil. I said, "Is that Largactil you've got 
me on?" And MacDermot sort of ... 
He's very like Jack Palance, oddly enough. 
Honest o God, he was the spittin' image of Jack 
Palance. And, he says, he sort of smiled, you 
know, by the way like, "Oh, how did you come to 
know the word Largactil?" You know what I mean 
like, sort of patronizing. I said, you know, "Is 
this Largactil that I 'm on?" You know it was 
exactly, the way he did it, it was exactly, sort 
of, well you know. [He was saying] "Do not think." 
"You shouldn't be talking about hat, that's not 
your concern to be talking about it." 
They want to keep everything that they have 
secret, you know, as part of the old routine. You 
know, like the astrologers or the Pharisees. You 
come down the centuries, and ... As you come down 
the centuries, there has always been a group, a 
society that has been secret. 
210 
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J: Hmmm. 
F: I mean, I actually think that Jesus Christ was 
speaking against that type of thing when He said, 
like when He said to the Pharisees and different 
people, He would have said things like, "You make 
burdens for the people's backs." And He said 
another time, "Because you say you can see, your 
sin remains." And, I take that to mean because you 
say you know it all, you're actually wrong. You're 
in error. You're committing a wrong on the people, 
you know. 
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J: Uh huh. 
F: Then, until '77 1 was OK. I was in the hospital 
in St. Patrick's till '71. 5 Then from '71-'77 I
was OK. I was working in Belfast most of that 
time. Then from December of 1977, I went, you 
know, "'round the bend," as it were. I lost 
contact with reality. I had a real schizophrenic 
episode. That's the word I prefer actually of all 
the terms that are used for, ... you know, having a 
"breakdown." I think having a breakdown is sort of 
bollixed. You'd think you were sort of collapsing 
into bits, you know. 
J: [Laughs] 
F: Strewn all over the floor you know. Yeah, there 
he is. He's had a breakdown, you know. There's 
one bit of him over there, yeah. I say an 
"episode" because I think what it is, obviously, 
presumably, sparing the man above, you know. Maybe 
the man above knows more about it than I do, but 
uh. It obviously must be some kind of chemical 
change that comes over the brain where you see 
things in a different way. I mean it lasts, I
think, for a certain time. Then, you know, rights 
itself again, for no apparent reason. I mean, uh 
.... I don't think that it has the remotest 
connection with stress or anything else. I just 
think actually, as I said to you before, I think. 6 
I think it's a completely time-based thing. 
There were things I thought about, though. When 
I was in, the day before I got into the hospital. 
The night that I spent at my brother's house - I 
couldn't sleep, you know. I didn't sleep at all 
that night. I remember thinking the vans, the kind 
of lorries, just right beside the kind of main 
road. And I thought he lorries and the vans were 
all full of dead bodies. 
I remember thinking this now. It's kind of, ... 
It's like being actually in a sort of horror movie, 
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you know, and watching it, and believing it, you 
know? 
J: Yes. 
F: Not just seeing it, and sort of laughing at it, 
or whatever. But being it, believing it. You sort 
of think ... For some reason ... it was connected 
with The Troubles in a way. The Catholics were all 
being murdered, you know. You know I had this 
terrible thought of, sort of, extermination camps, 
you know ... This is the Final Solution type of 
thing. Everything was horrible. You'd see 
something on the TV. It was sort of, you'd see 
something on the TV, and you'd think, ah ... It'd 
kind of remind you of Hitler, sort of like that. 
Things that you'd seen before .... There seemed 
to be a lot of cruelty about, you know. Again it 
was that hostile thing. It was well, you know, 
that I had before. But this time I was completely 
deluded, you know. It wasn't hat I was able to 
rationalize anything. It was completely unsided 
lone-sided?I, you know. 
And, I remember saying - when I got into the 
hospital eventually. My brother was with me, he 
brought me up to the hospital. It was quite near 
to where he lives. 
I went into the ward. I was down on the ward, 
and I said, I says, I was saying, "Where's all my 
friends?" And I was sort of crying, or shouting. 
"Where's all my friends? Where's Rosemary?" 
"Where's ... Tom?" You see, these were fellas that 
I worked with, people I worked with, the fella that 
I worked for, for a while, and all this. I didn't know 
where I was actually. I didn't actually know 
where I was, you know. It's funny how you're 
completely disoriented. 
J" You knew your brother. 
F: Oh yeah. I knew my brother all right, fair 
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enough. You knew certain things. It's funny that 
actually. If you could really remember. If you 
had a good memory and could remember exactly, it 
would be interesting to know, just what, how far 
it, the delusion, goes. And how far you're still 
"in touch" with reality. Because I obviously knew 
my brother. I knew where I lived. I knew the name 
of the road. I knew the name of the hospital. I 
think I knew I was in the hospital all right, as 
far as I know. I used to always be sort of afraid 
of that place. I thought it was sort of a 
depressing spectacle. It was one of the old 
asylum-type hospitals. 
J: What was that [the hospital] like? 
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F: I left at the end of October. 7 And then again 
in '79, I had another episode. In May '79. But 
this time it was mostly elation, you know. And, 
what Ruth O'Sullivan mentioned in that Irish Times 
article, s about being "driven" from place to place, 
you know. I had that. At one stage before I got 
into hospital that time, I walked all around 
Belfast, you know, from place to place. I used to 
walk. 
I thought I kind of had a mission, you know, 
somewhere to go. That's the way I was, 
I was completely "around the bend." I thought, you 
know ... I used to say things to people. I would 
say, - I went into the library and I was up a 
couple stairs, and this man come up to me and says 
- and I said to him - I was kind of thinking 
about this Protestant/Catholic thing and all - and 
I says to him, "Don't forget hat justice is a 
Roman word." 
And he sort of, he never, you know, he didn't say, 
"You're mad" or something or "What are you 
talking to me for?" He says, "Yeah. It's Roman 
but not Italian." 
[Laughs] 
I think what he meant by that was that it was 
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Roman, ancient Roman, but it wasn't connected with 
the pope, like. 
J: Yeah. 
F: He was getting in a point. I knew he was a 
Protestant, actually, because .... I kind of knew 
him I think, actually. I had seen him before. 
But .... [Laughs]. He didn't know me I think, you 
know. You'd speak to people on the street. I 
remember saying to this woman, you know, to a 
traffic warden at night time, "I must get home to 
my flat," and so on. And she said, "What's wrong 
with you, love?" You know, she thought I was kind 
of a lost soul or something. She didn't know I was 
mad. 
And I ended up, and I ended up at that time, too, 
at The Martyr's Memorial Church, you know Paisley's 
business. 9 
J: Oh really? 
F: Actually, there was a marriage or something 
going on, you know, at the time. And, I went up to 
the door, and there was this guy in a swallow tail 
coat, you know, dress suit and all. And .... I said 
to him - I was kind of again in a sort of a daze, 
you know - and I said, " I 'm a Roman Catholic, and 
I want to see the Church." And he sort of didn't 
say anything, he just grabbed me by the arm, you 
know. He steered me out to the, to the, you know, 
to the gate of the church. And I walked on. 
J: Where did you go? 
F: I resumed my march. And I remember actually 
that I used to .... I had this .... delusion at the 
time. I 'd always been sort of thinking - at that 
time I had been reading a fair bit, a wee bit, 
of history, and I was thinking on this thing. 
You see the Roman Empire and the British Empire, 
you see. Like the Roman Empire was like the 
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Catholic Church, say, if you were a materialist, 
you could say that the Catholic Church was kind of 
the successor to the Roman Empire, took over from 
the Roman Empire. And the pope was kind of a Roman 
Emperor in a sense. And then the British kind of 
rebelled against it, like. 
I was always looking for things. I got them out. 
There was things in Shakespeare. Someone says in 
one of the historical plays, he says, "Britain is 
an Empire by itself, and we will nothing pay for 
wearing our own noses. ''1~ In other words, like, 
they were going to set up in business for 
themselves, and break away. That's in effect what 
happened. And then when they took over the role, 
eventually, of the Romans like being the world 
rulers. So I was preoccupied with this, so when I
got mad, you see, it was all going over me head and 
all. 
[Laughs] 
There was a place in Belfast, Caesar's Palace, 
you see. One of these .... there's a Caesar's 
Palace everywhere. One of these old places with 
slot machines. And I thought [laughs], I remember 
thinking this had something to do with Caesar 
actually, you know; it was Roman. I said, "The 
Romans are ..." - I remember thinking, "The Romans 
are setting up in business," you know. There must be 
something oing on, 
And then - I used to walk along those security 
gates H all the time, there used to be a lot of 
soldiers, you'd see a lot of British soldiers 
hanging about, you see. I used to be going along 
like this, you see. You know in these old 
Hollywood Roman movies, they would have the salute 
like this you know [demonstrates]. And, here was 
me going along -' I had some idea you see that kind 
of the Romans and the British were kind of ... 
cooperating .... I don't know what, it was kind of 
mixed up. I was going along like this you see, 
going like this [demonstrates] to the soldiers. 
[Laughs] 
I don't know what they made of this, you know. 
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THE USES OF STORY 
This text answers to many of the definitions that we have developed in 
anthropology and other disciplines around the notion of "story" or "nar- 
rative." It develops a plot within a temporal frame, it is narrated by an 
agentive subject who has a sense for his audience, and the main char- 
acter (the narrator) confronts, and must adapt to, the intentions of other 
characters in the story (Bruner 1986). 
This story also clearly relates what we might call personal experience. 
Finbar gives us a rich sense of what it means to feel socially marginal 
or that one's everyday reality is slipping away or changing in an extraor- 
dinary fashion. He articulates a rich phenomenology of the emotions of 
abandonment, terror, amusement, suspicion, and hostility. 
Nonetheless, this story is also inexorably bound up with an institutional 
topography. We cannot understand the narrative flow of this story - not its 
structure, not its humor, not its pathos - without understanding the insti- 
tutional channels 12 that at once restrict he freedom of, and give shape to, 
indeed make possible, the creation of this particular story. Within Finbar's 
story, for example, this topography most clearly entails the structure of 
psychiatric knowledge and praxis, the institution of the Asylum. The tech- 
nologies, objects of knowledge, practices and erasures that are the stuff of 
psychiatric praxis take up most of the first part of this fragment (up to Line 
224). Finbar, however, develops critiques about this institution through 
other forms of what we can only call "institutionalized" knowledge. At 
times, for example, he gives voice to the authority of a morality clearly 
connected to the Catholic Church (e.g., the deserving vs. the undeserving 
sufferer as well as the idea that suffering conveys authority on the sufferer). 
The latter half of this text also references, and plays with, alternately with 
pathos and humor, the institutionalized violence of the sectarian divide 
in his adopted home of Belfast at the time of his most severe psychotic 
breaks. It is on and through this landscape that Finbar as narrator fleshes 
out his seemingly personal experience of illness and amelioration, as well 
as his own annotations on his life. 
EMPLOTTERS AND EMPLOTMENTS 
In addition to these qualities, this text is also clearly made from the perspec- 
tive of a temporal divide in which institutional psychiatry has a pride of 
place. At the time of the telling, for example, Finbar has already been, to use 
a phrasing popular with much of medical anthropology, "therapeutically" 
(or at least "diagnostically") emplotted (Mattingly 1994; DelVeccio-Good 
1994). 13 The narrative trajectory on which he has been sent is one of 
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chronicity and despair. His reflections are made from the other side of an 
historical barrier between the past and the present defined by the presence 
of institutional psychiatry and its technologies (medication and visits by a 
psychiatrist). 14Although e often jumps around in the temporal sequence 
of his life, employing knowledge gained uring a long career as a mental 
patient o comment on certain portions of the narrative, the contact with a 
psychiatrist in 1966 and with hospitalization i  1971 and the two episodes 
of hospitalization i  1977 and 1979 - form the beginning and the conclu- 
sion to this particular story that establishes his identity as a mental patient. 
The force of diagnostic emplotment is most evident in the frame for 
which Finbar initially groped to put upon our conversation. Finbar starts 
his discussion of his association with a mental illness in the genre of a 
medical history. He begins by relating the seeking of care for a specific 
experience. He may have felt that this conversation was to be a replay 
of a repeating conversation that he has been having with various health 
professionals for more than twenty ears (Lines 1-8). This connection to 
a label reflecting his disordered interiority is both a dominant part of his 
identity and the main battle line within his life story between an identity 
and institutional power. 
The genre of medical history, however, is rapidly abandoned as Finbar 
develops the narrative. His reference to the local term for psychiatrist, 
"nerve specialist," for example, points to a reinterpretation of the notion of 
specialty that I have explored elsewhere. Indeed, I have argued that terms 
like "nerve specialist," the "T and F," and the "big house ''15 are parts of 
various local projects dedicated tothe domestication f the asylum in rural 
Ireland (Saris 1994). Through the use of such terms, Finbar clues us in that 
both the Asylum and the knowledge that it generates are open to challenge 
and reinterpretation. 
Very early on in this transcript as well, Finbar sets a pattern where 
descriptions of experience interpenetrate with analyses and critiques of 
institutional presences. The section beginning and ending with a critique 
of the medical definition of alcoholism (Lines 21-145), for example, runs 
together the experience of life inside the Omagh Mental Hospital and 
the burdens of laboring under a diagnosis of major mental illness with 
a cogent critique of the hierarchy in the asylum and the deployment of 
the category of mental illness with which he happens to be associated in
popular culture. Similarly, Finbar's rich phenomenological description of 
his exceptional experience ofan increasingly hostile nvironment, "atotal 
altering of perception" (Lines 161-76), is also preceded and set up by a 
description and a critique of two institutional technologies, the visit by a 
psychiatrist and the prescription of Largactil. 
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SUFFERING AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Throughout this section, Finbar also makes everal rhetorical moves within 
what we might call the institutional channel of his diagnosis along the 
axes of legitimation and responsibility. First, he develops a position in a 
symbolic ontinuum of personal responsibility that questions the current 
status of alcoholism as "a disease entity" and therefore outside of the 
realm of the will. At the same time, he implies (Lines 31-32) that "the 
schizophrenics" (and note that his is one the very few times that Finbar uses 
the nominal adjective, and that his occurs only in the context of discussing 
interactions in the mental hospital) are "really sick" and deserving of 
sympathy in the way that alcoholics are not. 
At the same time, Finbar is weaving in a point about social justice in 
this part of the story. He sees his life as so marginal, for example, that 
even other marginals (such as alcoholics, manic-depressives, and mental 
handicaps) seem to have substantially more cultural capital available to 
them, and he wonders why his plight generates so little sympathy in the 
hearts and minds of others - "We are in fact the lowest" (Line 35-36). The 
"we" here is marvelously ambiguous in a fashion that is incomprehensible 
in the absence of the appreciation of institutional authority. On the one 
hand, it can be read as "We -- schizophrenics" because according to the 
institutional hierarchy as Finbar describes it, the referent group for this 
noun is in fact "the lowest." On the other hand, the use of the word "we" 
is also a refusal to use the noun form "schizophrenic" and at this level can 
be read as part of the resistance to this term that Finbar displays in other 
parts of the manuscript. 
Finally, Finbar points to the abyss of hopelessness that runs alongside 
the life of most people diagnosed with schizophrenia in Western countries. 
"The attitude that people have to lunatics or schizophrenics is that they 're, 
you know, dangerous ...horrible" (Lines 47-49). Indeed, as Finbar points 
out, in popular perception of mental i lness in the United States and Europe, 
to the extent hat others with major mental illnesses are dangerous or 
hopeless, then they are often assumed to be "a bit schizophrenic." This 
popular attitude finds support in rates of recovery of schizophrenia n
industrialized nations being very much lower than in less industrialized 
ones (Warner 1985; see also Barrett 1988). 
Connected to this feeling of intra-institutional inferiority is a more per- 
vasive sense that Finbar has about always seeming to be at the wrong end 
of power relationships based on knowledge and authority. An enduring 
theme in many of our conversations, for example, was how little control 
he exercises over his life, indeed, even over the terms in which his life 
is discussed, due to his structural position. His money is provided by the 
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state, his home by his father, and nearly all of his interactions - mostly 
clinic visits and contact with fellow sufferers through the Schizophrenia 
Association of Ireland - is dominated by his illness label. This feeling of 
structural inferiority is most keenly felt by him vis gt vis psychiatry and 
psychiatrists. Psychotropic drugs are for Finbar a prototypical example of 
this helplessness. From their mode of administration (watched ingestion or 
injection) to their effects (tranquilization) to their side-effects (interference 
with volitional activities, such as involuntary muscle movements, impo- 
tence, loss of speech) they emphasize and reproduce this feeling of being 
overpowered. 
THE INTERVIEWER INTER-VIEWED 
During this initial part of the conversation, Finbar also offers the ethno- 
grapher a series of challenges concerning the injustice of his social and 
institutional positions in relation to the intimate connection between 
knowledge and authority. This critique is germane to the second theme 
of this work, that is the textualization of Finbar's life in the context of a 
knowledge-product in medical anthropology. The status of the category of 
alcoholism, the nature of professional nd popular assessments of bipolar 
disorder, the status of medical knowledge more broadly, and the jus- 
tice of the authority of expert knowledge as such, for example, are all 
the subject of comment in Lines 65-122 and again in Lines 182-223. 
These challenges were graded, I believe, according to his assessment of
my likely reaction. The section above begins with ai~hetorical question, 
"The alcoholics, what exactly is it?" and ends with a serious critique of 
the institutionalized authority of professional expertise (Lines 111-122). 
Finbar sustains a theme in this section (and revisits it in the next) that is 
essentially a broadside against the concept of"the expert," particularly the 
will to power of the expert based on a culturally validated claim to special- 
ized knowledge around which certain barriers, from levels of education to 
technical languages, are erected and defended. 
One of the reasons that Finbar textualized his experience in the way 
that he did is to render it impossible for me to escape the issue of his 
institutionalized voicelessness. I cannot help but think that his weaving 
together of his accounts of being engulfed by a particularly unfortunate 
illness label side-by-side with a critique of the institutional basis of the 
knowledge that undergirds the authority of this label was deliberately 
provocative on his part. Finbar points out the erasures upon which the insti- 
tutional authority of his own diagnostic emplotment rests. These erasures 
include actual silence, such as Dr. MacDermot's refusal to discuss Largactil 
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with him to an experience that Finbar shares with many other chronically 
mentally ill individuals, that is any resistance to institutional uthority 
being constructed as a lack of insight into his illness. Finbar's tactic 
in this section forced me to acknowledge, if only by my own silence, 
a critique of knowledge-power from which my own project (a doctoral 
project geared in part to establishing my own expertise) could not be 
completely absolved. 
CONFLICTED PHENOMENOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS 
After Finbar's initial reflections on the nature of the institution, he goes 
on to consider in more detail his first serious institutional contacts (Lines 
130-222). The first thing that is apparent about his section is how Finbar 
tacks easily between the first time that he was given neuroleptics and his 
first hospitalization episode almost five years later, with only my question 
interrupting this flow (Lines 129-146). 
Notice also the easy movement between different orders of knowledge 
and experience towhat can only be called political critique - from contact 
with the technologies of the asylum (neuroleptics and visits by a psychia- 
trist) to an attempt to understand these technologies (the failed conversation 
about Largactil) to his questioning of the status of expert knowledge (i.e., 
Finbar's off-hand observation that doctors are very short on philosophy) 
(Lines 161-164). Perhaps, the most interesting aspect of this last critique 
is the manner in which Finbar refracts the medical handling of psychiatric 
patients through areading of a scene from the New Testament that is remin- 
iscent of Dostoyevsky's critique of mystery and authority in the scene of the 
returned Christ and the Grand Inquisitor (1980:227-240). The mystery that 
surrounds psychiatric practice and the authority that Finbar sees as flowing 
from this mystery comes in for severe criticism in Lines 211-220. 
All these examples erve to illustrate what Foucanlt calls the points 
of confrontation i a knowledge-power setting (1980, particularly "The 
Two Lectures" also Foucault 1973, 1979). First, Finbar argues against 
what Douglas (1987:101-105) identifies as a primary form of institutional 
power, that is, the ability to name. Note, for example, his struggling with 
the nominal form "a schizophrenic" and the more grammatically ambig- 
uous "schizophrenic" (Lines 139-141), and how the latter form eventually 
wins out. This grammatical slippage is followed immediately by the more 
folksy description of "around the bend." Next, he develops an extensive 
description of his altered phenomenology at that time (Lines 162-182) as 
a critique of what he considers to be Dr. MacDermot's inappropriate ques- 
tion, "Do you feel people are against you?" (Lines 153-4). This expands 
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into a more general statement, "Doctors are usually very short on philos- 
ophy" (Lines 163-4), foreshadowing Finbar's extended commentary on 
the irrationalities of how this particular psychiatrist administers Largactil 
(Lines 184-223). 
In this section, Finbar also problematizes the issue of the relationship 
between textuality and subjectivity. The section begins by Finbar acknowl- 
edging an altered sense of himself as a subject, but also by resisting the 
convention of this state becoming a sort of narrator 16 - "I didn't actually 
go 'around the bend' as such. You know, I wasn't mad in the conventional 
sense of the word" (Lines 141-43). He then goes on to defamiliarize the 
psychiatrist ( he character at this point of the plot with seemingly the best 
claim to an unproblematic subjectivity) by pointing to the strangeness of
asking someone, "Do you feel people are against you?" before even saying 
"Hello" (Lines 154-55). He also gets a laugh at the psychiatrist's symbolic 
expense in speculating on the uneasy relationship between medical doctors 
and philosophy. 
More dramatically, Finbar radically complicates MacDermot's subjec- 
tivity via a process of intertextualization, substituting Jack Palance (an 
actor who has made a career of being professionally inscrutable) just 
before critiquing the irrational secrecy that Finbar sees as surrounding 
psychiatric praxis (Lines 193-208). It is difficult to describe how witty 
was this remark "in context." Even a close transcription (which this is 
not) cannot do justice to the subtle metalingual markers of intonation and 
hand and facial gestures that framed his speech at this point and made this 
crossing of texts so seemingly appropriate. 
Once again, however, this reading of the text that I have just presented, 
that is, Finbar's questioning Of Largactil expanding into musings on the 
epistemological shortcomings of some of the psychiatrists with whom 
he has interacted, their association with Hollywood movie actors, finally 
developing into a reflection on Jesus' criticism of the relationship between 
mystery and authority, is itself determined by a particular interpretive 
stance. If I was committed to a very different institutional narrative, for 
example, I would very likely use the exact same fragment as an indication 
of such important diagnostic markers as a loosening of associations and 
lack of insight. But this is precisely the point. Both the production of this 
text and its interpretation in the context of another discourse is saturated 
by assumptions and practices that "set up" which of the multiplicities of 
meanings within it are placed in the foreground. Comparing how differ- 
ent discourses are "set up" in this respect forces us to examine the real 
social sites where power lives. Here, "power" is anything but an abstract 
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entity; rather, it inheres in the production and promulgations of specific 
interpretations of a socially situated story. 
THE SECTARIAN DIVIDE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED VIOLENCE 
1977 and 1979, the years of Finbar's most serious breakdowns, sepa- 
rated by almost a year of hospitalization, are treated as a narrative unit in 
his imagination (Lines 194-415). This block of time forms an important 
dividing line in his life story that stands as a something of a bookend to the 
'66/'71 acquaintance with psychiatric technologies that, as it were, sets up 
his "career" as a mental patient. Again, as in the case of Dr. MacDermot, it
is a technology of the asylum, in this case hospitalization, that ies together 
the two incidents recounted here. I have rather artificially divided up the 
two episodes recounted below, partly in order to comment on some aspects 
of a long stretch of text, partly to highlight my own mistake of asking a 
question about he hospital in Belfast o which Finbar had been committed 
in late 1977 during what I thought was a pause in the story. Finbar ignored 
this interruption i order to complete his sense of the episode. 
However unhappy were the years 1977-1979 for Finbar, they were also 
very bad years for Belfast. Sectarian tensions were rampant and there were 
times where being on the streets as a young Catholic male was actually quite 
dangerous. In particular, the Shankill Butchers, agroup that was composed 
of individuals who were part paramilitary fanatics and part serial killers, 
had been randomly pulling men off the streets in known Catholic areas 
and murdering them in a brutal and ritualized fashion in the late '70s - an 
obvious worry in the life of a man in the habit of taking long walks alone 
in the city at night. Indeed, so random were these slayings that a couple of 
Protestants were killed accidentally by this gang. In any case, it was felt 
in many Nationalist circles at the time that the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC) was not diligently pursuing these cases (for a good summary of this 
period, see Dillon 1989). 
Finbar once again begins this segment by running together different 
discourses about his internal phenomenology that are symbolically and 
politically charged. First, he gives voice to folk knowledge of excep- 
tional states, "'round the bend" (Line 229), then to psychiatric knowledge, 
"schizophrenic episode" and "breakdown" (Lines 231), then to religious 
understandings, "the man above knows more about it" (Lines 243-245), 
then to his own situated knowledge about his condition (Lines 245-249), a
very physiological description that he still frames as expressly invalidating 
the psychiatric viewpoint. 
Once again, Finbar's "internal" description sets the stage for a descrip- 
tion of extemal events. Finbar's narrated breakdowns in 1977 and 1979, 
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for example, play in complex ways on the relationship between his internal 
phenomenology, that is his status as a social outsider and his experience 
of exceptional states of consciousness, and some of the broader issues in 
Belfast at.that ime. Thus, the institutionalized violence of The Troubles 
is eerily reflected in the interior landscape of an alienated young Catholic 
male experiencing an extraordinary state of consciousness. This seems to 
be less an "embodied" tension (pace Csordas 1990) than a sort of mutual 
scripting, where the institutionalized violence in Finbar's behavioral envi- 
ronment overdetermines a delusional trajectory, and the narrative of the 
delusion serves as a critique of the institutionalized violence. We see, for 
example, a very interesting movement from Finbar's own altered percep- 
tion (feeling like the inside of a horror movie) to the violence in the city 
at large. Especially important here is the use of "it was that hostile thing 
again" (Lines 283-4) which knits together this part of the story and his 
earlier description of his difficulties. It also allows Finbar to expressly 
equate his perception of phenomenological "hostility" in his behavioral 
environment to the "concrete" hostility of The Troubles. 
The power of this part O f the story to move the reader/hearer (either to 
pathos or humor) is the result of Finbar unning together critical images and 
different orders of knowledge in arresting ways. The vans and lorries on 
the road that he always ees and knows well, the bodies in the lorries which 
he cannot see, but whose dread he feels, the image of Hitler and the Final 
Solution, whose story is known to him through is interest in history, and 
his sense of social and personal abandonment that is an old, if unwelcome, 
companion are narrated on the same plane. This epistemological flattening 
knits together this segment drawing the reader/hearer into a peculiar world, 
while providing the basis of the rhetorical force of the connection between 
images in a disordered mind and the frightening state of the society at large 
whose bitter divisions can also, when viewed from the proper perspective, 
be the stuff of humor. 
It is clear, moreover, that Finbar was very interested in precisely situ- 
ating my understanding of his pushing together of these levels. Finbar's 
"you knows" become more frequent this part of the transcript, wo of them 
hard on the heel on "it was that hostile thing again" (Lines 283-4). I take 
these "you knows" to be Finbar's hermeneutical probes to satisfy himself 
as to my understanding of his narrative argument comparing his disor- 
dered internal phenomenology to his institutionally disordered interactive 
environment, tying together his internal and external motivations. 
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FOOLS GO BOLDLY 
From the horror of the "Final Solution" imagery in the vans and lorries 
episode, we come to the narration of another florid episode (interrupted 
by a question on my part that Finbar pointedly ignored) that is profoundly 
funny. In the midst of an episodic loss of contact with "reality," Finbar 
manages to interact peacefully across political and sectarian divides. His 
"unmotivated" conversation with passers-by, his interest in the Church of 
one of the best known bigots in the Unionist Community, and his bizarre, if 
undeniably humorous interactions with British soldiers are highly charged 
symbolically. "I was always looking for things, I got them out" (Line 
393), Finbar insists, while tacking between descriptions and critiques of 
various authoritative institutions, provocatively running together the his- 
tory of Catholic Church, the historical growth of Great Britain as a world 
power, the modem British occupation of the Six Counties, and the Roman 
Empire. 
There is real danger here for Finbar- wandering promiscuously through 
the unmarked but very real borders that scar the geography of Belfast, 
approaching nervous English troopers waving a Roman salute, reaching 
out across the sectarian divide with a provocative philological analysis, or 
unexpectedly visiting the church of another community - were not, and to 
some extent still are not, safe activities in which to engage in Belfast. 
It is easy, then, to read this part of the story as simple "resistance," with 
Finbar cast in the role of the wise fool, carrying the banner of his community 
into an enduring colonial struggle. At times, Finbar tactically plays with 
this part of his life history, extracting this narrated episode for public 
display, particularly when his anti-psychiatric opinions get him in trouble 
with the predominantly family-controlled Schizophrenia Association of 
Ireland. As I wrote in my field notes after Finbar had a very tough time 
with a group of family members to whom he was making apresentation: 
Finbar has a comical story of one of the times he was "around the bend" in Belfast. At 
the time he had developed an intense religious preoccupation which centered on this 
Catholic/Protestant problem. By way of explanation we might note that this episode 
occurred in 1979 at a very bad time in The Troubles. In any case, during this episode, 
Finbar felt "driven" around the city wandering through both Catholic and Protestant sec- 
tions of the city throughout the night. During the middle of the next morning, he found 
himself at the steps of The Martyr's Church of Dr. Ian Paisley. A wedding was in progress, 
when Finbar goes to the doors of the church and identifies himself as a Roman Catholic to 
two large men in tie and tails (probably well-dressed bodyguards) at the door. He requested 
to "see the church." He was grabbed and hustled out the gates. 
This story is funny, a ray of harmless absurdity during a time of brutal absurdity. Finbar 
successfully contrasted the violence of the "sane," the slaughter ofpeople for their eligious 
beliefs and community affiliations, to the benign befuddlement of he mad. He also success- 
fully emphasized a unity that potentially encompassed this group (myself excepted) with 
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respect to another collective, i.e. Irish Catholics as over against people who do not like Irish 
Catholics, successfully defusing some of the hostility that he knows his anti-psychiatric 
views provoke in this audience [Field Notes 1 February 1989]. 
This performance is effective because while there are many shades of 
opinion to be found in the South concerning the political situation in the 
North, it is a safe bet that, in any audience in the Dublin area, there will be 
few die-hard Ian Paisley fans. A joke at his symbolic expense, particularly 
a well-performed one, is rhetorically powerful. 
Despite the overt political aspects embodied inthis part of the fragment, 
Finbar's sense of the existence of power in the strange political terrain of 
Northern Ireland is fundamentally more complex than simple resistance 
would indicate. Just after this point in the interview, for example, after an 
off-hand comment that I canvassed before I thought of what I was saying, 
Finbar contemplated other aspects of the "colonial" superstructure with 
which he has come in contact. 
J" Ah, the legions of the colonial state. 
F: That's hard to say, now. I don't know. I 
wouldn't had got to university had I lived in the 
south. 
J: Why is this? 
10 
F: Because of the grants ... I wouldn't have got 
the grants like - it was only because of the 
grants that I got from the "oppressive" British 
government that got me to university, you know. 
So, there's two sides to imperialism. 
15 J: [Laughs] 
20 
F: There's Santa Claus and the big stick. It 
depends on which you get I suppose .... The only 
side I ever saw really, if I was honest about 
British imperialism, was that I got grants out of 
it to go to university. And, my father had a good 
job in the imperialist post office. 
After a long pause, Finbar completed his story. 
F: So, then in '77 and '79, when I'd been around 
the bend, when I came back to normality, I realized 
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that, I realized myself that I'd been schizophrenic 
because I knew all the symptoms of schizophrenia by 
that time. I had been .. all through the 
seventies, I had been really studying. I had been 
reading a lot of Eysenck 17 and other psychologists, 
and other things about psychiatry, so I knew ... I 
could have written a short book on psychiatry. 
J: [Smiles] 
F: A slightly irreverent book, mind you. But when 
15 I came back to normality, you know, I didn't know 
what the hell, you know. I was mad after those 
three weeks in '77 and again in '79, I knew that I
was a, I was schizophrenic. I said to the nurse. 
... I said to the doctor, "Is it schizophrenia?" 
20 It was a young female doctor, she said, "Yeah." 
That's when I knew. 
INSTITUTIONAL PRODUCTIONS 
I framed my analysis of this narrative by arguing that institutional realities 
are produced as discursive objects in a story in such a way as to both 
restrict he freedom of, and give shape to, the narrative flow. It is evident, 
for example, that Finbar's story of "his" life bears the imprint of the power 
wielded by the institutions in whose orbits he has been caught. At the same 
time, there is clearly much more going on here than the mere working 
out of constraint and necessity. We have seen, for example, how Finbar's 
narrative has not just been restricted by the presence of institutions, as 
I have defined them, its own "flow" has cut into social life, uncovering 
institutional sediments, to use a tried and true anthropological trope, for 
reflection and commentary. 
I do not mean by this trope of flow for one aspect of Finbar's story 
that there is romantic freedom innate to "narrative" in the abstract that the 
presence of institutions in the abstract inevitably reigns in. I do mean that 
Finbar's specific narrative produces pecific sorts of institutional power 
as discursive objects and that in this process these powers then become 
open to examination and critique. The satirical quality of the incident with 
Dr. MacDermot relies on the knowledge of how power is institutionalized 
in psychiatric settings. Both the horror of the lorries outside of Finbar's 
window and the humor of his interaction with a Belfast Unionist and 
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British soldiers requires aknowledge of how political power and violence 
are institutionalized in the Northern Ireland's ectarian conflict. This way 
of looking at the relationship between arrative and institution emphasizes 
both the undeniable creativity inherent in narration and those real power 
relationships that exist in the social life of narrators. 
This tension between flow and constraint becomes most evident at 
Finbar's most agentless (and, therefore, at his seemingly most plotless) 
moments in the story. Even Finbar's most florid symptoms play along 
this boundary between the potential of narrative freedom and the presence 
of institutional necessity in concrete social and historical circumstances. 
"Justice is a Roman word!" is at once the meaningless ejaculation of 
a wandering schizophrenic and a motivated, provocative probe into the 
open sore of the sectarian divide in a city split against itself. Both its status 
as a delusion as well as its wry humor are predicated on an institutionalized 
conflict that pits sectarian communities against one another in part on the 
basis of religious/historical justifications. The response it elicits (and the 
fact that it gets an engaged response is itself telling), "Yeah, it's Roman, 
not Italian," in its turn forms the basis for reflection on the very conflict 
that helped to script the delusional comment in the first place. "He was 
getting in a point," Finbar generously concedes, in a very long-standing 
conversation i the north of Ireland. 
Precisely this same quality of exposing institutional foundations imbues 
Finbar's conflicted anti-psychiatric annotations of a story he is generating 
in part with me in response to a question concerning a psychiatric illness 
label. Throughout this text, institutional discourses - things to be said 
and ways of saying them - are produced as discursive objects and then 
questioned by running them into one another within the narrative. Thus, 
Finbar deploys a vision of morality in order to critique the injustice of the 
relationship that he sees in psychiatry between mystery, knowledge and 
authority. In other places, Finbar attempts to appropriate the authority of 
scientific rationality to challenge what he sees to be an irrational sense 
of secrecy surrounding psychiatric praxis. Indeed, even the discourse of 
psychiatry itself is flirted with as a critical tool, when, for example, Finbar 
calls into question the disease status of alcoholism in order to make a point 
about he relationship of society to its various categories of marginals. 
Despite all these maneuvers, however, at the end of the narrative Finbar 
is himself produced as an institutional subject - "I knew that I was a, I 
was schizophrenic."-This production, however, is ambiguous and contested 
to the last, ending finally with, "Is it schizophrenia?" It is precisely this 
ambiguity that provides the "space" for Finbar's narrative, what makes it 
something other than a narrative and a quest for therapy. Within his own 
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story, the institution is interrupted, as it were, in the act of its own discursive 
reproduction, and this interruption, woven into Finbar's narrative, provides 
the "space" for Finbar's critical reflections as well as for his sustained 
narrative development of his more floridly psychotic moments. 
Note, however, this is a very different sort of "gap" than what is gen- 
erally pointed to in narrative theory as the necessary conditions of a story, 
even an illness narrative (Mattingly 1994). The space for this narrative is 
not just a question of Finbar's individual desire or longing - the difference 
between where he is and where he wants to be, or even in the conflicts 
and negotiations that we presume to exist between Finbar, his family, and 
his various therapists. It is also crucially located in the short circuiting of 
a diagnostic emplotment that works on an institutional logic of being able 
to define and to silence - that there are things to say and ways of saying 
them. We can only know this aspect of the "story" by knowing something 
outside of the conventional sense that we assign to the notion of "narra- 
tive." Therefore, I have argued for the inclusion of what I have called the 
institutional landscape upon which the story as such is grounded as part of 
any theory of narrative. My logic in using the trope of "landscape" comes 
from the fact that the image is complementary to the metaphor of "flow" 
through which we often understand narrative. Just as a river cuts into and 
exposes to view parts of the very bank that makes the river itself possible, 
so, too, do we need to consider the teller of this story and the institutional 
topography he is narrating as parts of one conceptual whole. 
CONCLUSION 
As far back as Hegel, Hayden White reminds us, narrativity has required a
sense of law and social order. At least, for the discipline of history, White 
argues, law provides the substrate upon which narrative can invoke and 
reproduce a sense of authority. It is on this basis that the meaning of events, 
their didactic qualities, ultimately the point of an historical narrative can 
be debated. Thus, White rather provocatively concludes that there can be 
no narrating without moralizing (White 1981:22-23). 
There is another aspect o this understanding of narrative that White 
does not explore in any great detail. To the extent hat many voices narrate, 
stories also contain the possibility of exposing the silences and erasures 
of the symbolic violence from which, following Bourdieu, the law itself 
derives legitimacy (Bourdieu 1991). Finbar's text has just this quality. It 
voices the silences and plays with the erasures that undergird the practices 
and discourses of institutional psychiatry, in particular, and other institu- 
tions as well. Thus, Finbar can spin out this story only because he exists 
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after a particular historical moment where he has been emplotted in a 
particular fashion that he is in part resisting. 
Such considerations, however, clearly lead us back to the other theme 
that I proposed in the beginning of this work, that is, how the institu- 
tional preconditions that both constrain and constitute the sub-discipline 
of medical anthropology provide us our own means of narrative production. 
I have, for example, retextualized a portion of an interview manuscript that 
seems to me to possess a certain coherence in the telling within another 
genre, the academic paper, that is not innocent of some of the critiques 
concerning the issue of authority and appropriation of voice that Finbar 
levels at psychiatry. This appropriation is the most distressing personal 
and theoretical problem in this analysis. Part of this problem is located 
in the nature of representation itself. The world calls for words, but any 
particular phenomenon always eludes its complete description. As Alan 
Young has pointed out in the case of Posttranmatic Stress Disorder, it is 
not a question of the assignation of names to states of exceptional, oreven 
ordinary, experience around which conflict takes place. There are no end 
of names for things. It is the ability to silence other names, erase other 
knowledges, through aclaim to symbolic-political-expert authority, that is 
the locus of real struggle in most of the settings in which we are interested 
(Young 1990). 
Therefore, I have argued that the narrative and the silences configure, 
even entail, one another and that both are set up by specific institutional 
configurations. Thus, I have tried to open up a wider theoretical space for 
the concept of institution than is common in much of narrative analysis. I 
hope that this sense of institution has provided insight into the conditions 
of the production of this particular narrative, as well as pointing to the 
usefulness of a more explicit focus on institutions in the development of a 
general theory of narrative in medical anthropology that will continue to 
generate interesting research questions.18 
A. Jamie Saris 
Department ofAnthropology 
St. Patrick's College 
Maynooth, Ireland 
NOTES 
1. One can read some of the tropic oncerns that developed in anthropology in 1970s 
(e.g., Tumer's concern with symbolic/ritual process, Femandez's interest inarguments 
with images) as containing some of the seeds of this narrative concern i the discipline. 
2. "T and F" is most likely derived from the nineteenth-century British colonial designa- 
tion of the place, "The Tyrone-Fermanagh District Lunatic Asylum." 
TELLING STORIES 69 
3. RTE is the acronym for Rddio Telefis Erin. 
4. A program on the BBC dealing with recent biomedical dvances indelineating bipolar 
disorder. It also focussed on the creativity of many people afflicted with this disorder. 
5. Finbar's 1971 hospitalization was in St. Patrick's Hospital in Dublin, a private hospital 
for which his father was willing to pay to avoid the local stigma of having a locally- 
known case of mental i lness in the family. 
6. The date we met, after his presentation at the SAI meeting. 
7. After almost eleven months of hospitalization. 
8. A multi-part article over several weeks in the Times, detailing experiences, family 
burdens, and recent biochemical research into schizophrenia. 
9. Ian Paisley, the radical leader of the Democratic Unionist Party. He is one of the most 
brazenly anti-Catholic leaders of the constitutional Unionist parties. 
10. The exact quote is "Britain is a world by itself; and we will nothing pay for wearing 
our own noses" (Cymbefline: Act III, Scene 1). 
11. Barriers composed of concrete blocks, corrugated iron, and razor wire, used by the 
British Army and the RUC to restrict access between various parts of the city. 
12. My usage of the word "channel" in this context is slightly different from that found in 
other works concerned with textual analysis. In these works, "channel" refers to types 
or media in which texts are expressed, i.e., how the formal properties of a textual mode, 
painting, poetry, etc., condition the nature of the text (Hanks 1989:101). Instead, I will 
take a different, perhaps even naive, view of channel in this work, looking at how the 
narrative flow is interrupted or shifted within this particular text, that is, where the 
narrator encounters oppositions or obstacles as part of the development of the story. 
13. There may be an important distinction to make between therapeutic and diagnostic 
emplotment. Schizophrenia is a category where this distinction may be particularly 
propos as modem psychiatry defines the ability to recover more and more out of the 
category as such. 
14. A temporal definition of disability and the concept of "emplotment" asI am using 
it here merges with Goffman's observation of thirty years ago that a mental patient 
embarks upon a "career" as part and parcel of a diagnosis of mental disorder and his 
or her official entry into the technologies a sociated with the asylum (Goffman 1961; 
see also Estroff 1993:259). 
15. Teach mtr in Gaelic can mean a large mansion as well as a mental hospital. 
16. First person accounts of mental i lness often use this convention of the "mad me" in 
retrospective narratives ( ee, for example, North 1987) 
17. For a popular example of the work of the psychologist H.J. Eysenck, see Eysenck 
1972. 
18. This research was made possible by support from The American Council of Learned 
Societies and the Social Science Research Council Doctoral Research Program for 
Western Europe (1988-1990). Early drafts of this paper benefited from my interaction 
with the Medical Anthropology Seminar of the Department of Social Medicine at 
Harvard Medical School where I was a Fellow in the Program for Clinically Relevant 
Medical Anthropology (1992-1994) funded by the National Institute for Mental Health 
and from feedback from the Department of Anthropology atthe University of California 
at Santa Cruz where I presented this data in the Winter of 1994. Finally, I would like to 
extend particular thanks to those who read various versions of this work and provided 
helpful comments, particularly Arthur Kleinman, Byron Good, and Robert Desjarlais. 
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